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Abstract

1. Introduction

Out of the many historical political events of the last
few years, in terms of outer space and outer space
law the final demise of the Soviet Union in
December 1991 no doubt was the most important.
One of the two superpowers in space disappeared as
a state never to return. The fifteen republics
formerly comprising the Soviet Union entered the
international community of states more or less in its
stead, eleven of them willing - so far - to remain
together within a framework for cooperation
ominously named "Commonwealth of Independent
States".
As to outer space, nine of those eleven states within
a week of the final demise of the Soviet Union
concluded the Minsk Space Agreement. The
Agreement was in force instantly, which is rather
unique and points to the importance attached by the
states involved to continuation in principle of
conducting space activities together. It is in the
framework of this Agreement that the future of the
space program of the former Soviet Union is to be
analyzed in legal terms, both as to programs already
in operation, as to programs which are really only in
a phase of development. In this respect comparisons
with the European Space Agency have indeed
already been made.
Furthermore, as one of the key-elements in the
historical events concerning the Soviet Union
consists of the transfer to a sort of capitalist society, a
glance at the role private enterprise is supposed to
play and is allowed to play under the Minsk Space
Agreement is in point. Once again, the European
Space Agency may provide an interesting example.
Thus, some light might be shed on the question as to
whether the former Soviet Union will witness the
development or creation of a European Space
Agency, Mark II, or a fundamentally different legal
framework for space activities.

The death blow was dealt to the Soviet Union in
December 1991. On the 1st of that month, in a
referendum in the Ukraine, after Russia the most
important of the Soviet Republics, an overwhelming
majority of 90,32 % voted for Ukrainian
independence. Russia and its President Boris Yeltsin
amongst others drew the obvious conclusion that a
Soviet Union without the Ukraine was not a viable
option; and on the 8th of December, in Minsk an
agreement on a Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) to replace the former Soviet Union was
concluded by Russia, the Ukraine and Byelorussia.1
Although President of the USSR Mikhael Gorbachev
tried to keep whatever was effectively left of the
Soviet Union alive, the other former republics
quickly choose sides with the CIS, and eight of them
(Georgia in the end not being included) on the 21st
of December in Alma Ata officially joinded the C1S.2
On Christmas 1991 Gorbachev accepted these
realities and stepped down; exit the Soviet Union,
enters the Commonwealth of Independent States.

2. The Soviet Union is dead, long lives the
Commonwealth of Independent States: the
Transition

One of the two superpowers in space, in fact the first
to enter outer space and the first to introduce men
into outer space, had thereby disappeared. The
problem is that, despite the suggestion that the role
of successor would be assigned to the CIS, it actually
were the fifteen republiCS formerly comprising the
Soviet Union which entered the international
community of states more or less in its stead. The
CIS namely is not a state under international law to
any extent, and therefore not in the position for
instance to simply succeed to the former Soviet
Union's international legal obligations} The CIS is
Copyright ©1992 by author. Published by the American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc. with permission. based on an agreement, the so-called Minsk
Released to AIAA to publish in all forms.
Agreement of 8 December 1991, as amended by a
protocol to that Agreement, the so-called Alma Ata
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analyzed in legal terms, wherefore an analysis of the
Minsk Space Agreement is now in point.1 2 This
analysis is to take place along the lines provided for
by a few basic elements of that Agreement; notably
the organizational structure possibly arising from it,
the programs to be covered by it, the financial
framework (both on the expenditure- and on the
income-sides), the special question of the
infrastructure and the use thereof, some specially
important issues of space law as far as reflected
(and, as far as not reflected, the consequences
thereof), and the question of accessions to the
Agreement.
The Minsk Space Agreement to begin with does not,
to any extent, create an international organization,
with independent legal personality at least in
muniCipal legal systems and powers distinct from
those of the totality of the 'member states'. Yet, an
embryonic structure is present in the Agreement,
just as it is the case in the Minsk Agreement on the
Commonwealth at large. In view moreover of the
actual interdependence of the former Soviet Union's
space
endeavours
and
the
resulting
interdependence in space activities of the states
concerned, a kind of community-of-necessity is
existing more or less covered by the framework
developed in the Minsk Space Agreement; a
community of ten states which I will call, for lack of
better words, the 'Space Commonwealth'.
The basis of future space research and exploitation
within this 'Space Commonwealth' is to be formed by
interstate programs 13, to be coordinated by the
Interstate Space Council 14 . This does not mean that
states can be active in outer space only in the
framework of the Space Agreement: their right to
have independent space programs is explicitly
confirmed 15, although the states pledged to bring at
least all activities concerning rocket technology
within the ambit of the interstate programs16 . Then,
all military and dual purpose (meaning both military
and civilian) space research and exploitation
programs are to be "ensured/assured by the joint
strategic armed forces"17, which is a rather
ambiguous formula.
Finally, as to the activities which are enVisaged
indeed under the Space Agreement, a difference is
made here as to "interstate programs for space
research and exploitation" in Article 4, and "the
exploitation of existing and the setting up of new
space systems for economic, scientific and military
purposes and the maintenance of the unique testing
base" of Article 5 18 , apparently focussing on the
large launchers, launching facilities, satellite
systems and the space station "Mir".
The distinction thus introduced becomes especially
important when we turn to the financial issues of
in terstate cooperation. The costs of 'Article 4programs' are to be "financed by means of
proportionate contributions by the states
participating in the present agreement"19. This

Protocol of 21 December 1991, with High
Contracting Parties, and not on a Constitution.
For space endeavours and space law that has
important consequences. The space industry of the
former Soviet Union was spread over almost the
whole of the territory of that Soviet Union, in other
words over most of the presently independent
republics4 . Russia is still by far the most important of
those, accounting for the largest part of the industry
(heavily concentrated around Moscow moreover) of
launchers, satellites, equipment and other items to
be used in outer space activities, most ground
tracking stations, spacecraft control centres and
design bureaus. The Ukraine however has an
important space industry too, plus two ground
tracking stations at Ternopol and Evpatoria.
Kazakhstan is even more important: although
Russia has two launching facilities at Plesetsk and
Kapustin Yar, the by far biggest and best placed
cosmodrome is that of Bajkonur in Kazakhstan.
Other republics are of lesser importance in terms of
space activities, although their existence in principle
for the purpose of space activities must indeed be
acknowledged.
The falling apart of the Soviet Union and the
important consequences arising therefrom for the
space industry involved happened to coincide more
or less with another string of developments. Since
glasnost and perestrojka have been gaining ground
commercialization to a slowly but increasing extent
was introduced in the field of space activities.S No
doubt, the tendency thus apparent in Soviet space
industry to commercialize, which inevitably will lead
to a significant amount of privatization too, will only
grow stronger in the coming years, due to the
increasing introduction of capitalist ideas and
elements in the economy of the former Soviet
Union 6 , the downgrading of defense as a
consequence of the end of the Cold War 7 and the
otherwise prevailing financial and economic
difficulties making it unlikely for much public
money to be spent in outer space - relative to the
extents to which such money used to be spent in the
old Soviet Union 8.

3. Former Soviets in Space: the Minsk Agreement
Nevertheless, space remains a big issue in the
republics of the former superpower in space. Nine of
those eleven states participating in the CIS within a
week of the final demise of the Soviet Union
concluded the Minsk Space Agreement 9 ., whereas
the Ukraine has joined later, in July 1992 10 . The
Agreement was in force instantly11, which is rather
unique and points to the importance attached by the
states concerned to continuation in principle of
conducting space activities together. It is in the
framework of this Agreement that the future of the
space program of the former Soviet Union is to be
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leaves a number of questions open, however, as to
what proportions would be chosen etcetera. Such
legal uncertainty has been avoided on the issue of
'Article 5-programs', for on a specific program
"expenditure (... ) [is to bel distributed in accordance
with the proportionate participation,,20 in such a
program. This would almost be a superfluous
tautology, if it did not also cover potential profit
gained from such exploitation activities.
If independent programs of states, the only
alternative to interstate programs as defined under
the Agreement, are planned to make use of the
infrastructure of other states, the interested parties
have to determine such use by separate
agreements 21 , no doubt providing for a different
financial settlement than enVisaged under the
Minsk Space Agreement itself. The latter provides
concerning interstate programs that they are to be
"implemented on the basis of existing space
complexes and space infrastructure facilities", just
as those programs which are "being set up,,22 . The
states concerned in this respect oblige themselves
"not to make decisions or carry out actions which
entail the cessation (impediment) of the normal
functioning of space centers and facilities in the
space infrastructure sited on their territories,,23.
Space law, and especially its important
responsibility- and liability-regimes, is also dealt with
in the Minsk Space Agreement, be it in summary
fashion. The states of the 'Space Commonwealth' are
to develop their activities "in accordance with
existing international (legal) norms,,24, but the
contents of their state responsibility, other than that
it is acknowledged in general, need elaboration in a
special agreement 25 , whereas the procedure for
assigning "compensation for damages associated
with the use of space equipment,,26 also depends
upon further decisions. Reference in this respect
may be had to the Preamble, although this does of
course not provide for a binding legal obligation. 27
Nevertheless, the general principles of state
responsibility for national activities not in conformity
with international space law 28 and liability of a state
for damage caused by objects launched by it, with its
help, or from its territory or facility29, will of course
continue to apply to these ten states of the 'Space
Commonwealth,3D, irrespective of the precise
content of the Minsk Space Agreement 31 . It will also
be clear that, the CIS itself, being no state and no
state successor to the Soviet Union, can never be
held responsible or liable under space law for
material breaches of obligations or damage
occurring, nor will it be able to act as a registration
state and exercise some kind of 'quasi-jurisdiction'
as long as it does not at least become an
international organization.
In this respect it is to be noted that both Russia and
Kazakhstan, the two only republics with launching
facilities and therefore very liable to become liable
as launching states 32, are among the ten parties to
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the Minsk Space Agreement. Their international
obligations under Articles VI and VII of the Outer
Space Treaty, of special importance in this light, are
thus reinforced at least in a principled way by the
commitments under the Minsk Space Agreement,
especially of course Articles 6 and 7 as dealt with
above.
As to Moldova, although no party to the Minsk
Space Agreement itself,. it is nevertheless still bound
to the international obligations arising for instance
from Articles VI and VII of the Outer Space Treaty,
as firstly, those Articles are codifications of
customary law valid outside of the treaty framework,
and secondly, Articles 12 and 13 of the Minsk
Agreement establishing the CIS confirm a general
duty to abide by legal international obligations
applicable to the former Soviet Union.
For those four former Soviet republics remaining
outside of the Commonwealth-framework and its
subframework for space activities, Georgia,
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, at least the first
remark on customary validity of the Outer Space
Treaty's principles would apply, even apart from
questions concerning state succession to obligations
of the former Soviet Union.
Finally, it is to be noted that Article 1 of the Minsk
Space Agreement allows for accession by other
states, be it in such a general way33 that it is not
clear whether accession can only be in respect of
"the present agreement" as a whole, or whether "the
consent of the participating state" would also allow
for adherence to specific programs only. This
question will for the time being be perhaps of an
academic character, and moreover probably be
solved in the end rather by practice than by legal
refinement, yet the point is to be noted.
This then is the general legal framework for space
activities of the former Soviet Union, as it evolved
from the dramatic developments of last December,
1991. Before turning to consecutive developments
and their relationship with, and relevance for this
legal framework, it will be very interesting to reflect
on the latter by way of comparing it to that other
existing general legal framework for cooperation in
outer space activities between independent
sovereign states in Europe, that of the European
Space Agency.

4. Western Europeans in Space: the European Space
A~ency

The European Space Agency (ESA) evolved out of
two prior international European organizations in
the field of space activities, the European Space
Research Organization (ESRO) and the European
Organization for the Development and Construction
of Space Vehicle Launchers (ESRO), which had been
established in 1962-4. ESA, more or less merging
these two organizations, was established in 1975 by
way of the Convention for the Establishment of a
European Space Agency (hereafter ESA

Convention), which entered into force in 1980.34 At
present, ESA consists of thirteen member states
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, Spain and the United Kingdom), one
further associate member state (Finland, since 1987)
and one non-European state participating ad hoc in
specific projects (Canada).35 Thus, it may be said
~hat more or less all western European states
mterested in space activities are members of ESA
and parties to the ESA Convention.
This brings us to the fact that analysis of the ESA
Convention, for the purpose of comparison to the
Minsk Space Agreement, should start with the
important remark that, unlike that Agreement of
course, the ESA Convention provides for a veritable
international organization to be established
thereby.36 ESA consists essentially of two organs.
First there is the Council, composed of
representatives of the member states 37 , and in that
regard similar to the Interstate Space Council,
although the ESA Council, both in legal theory38 and
in developed practice, provides for a much more
elaborated and detailed example. Second there is
the Director General assisted by a staff 39 ,
comprising the true organizational aspect of ESA as
illustrated furthermore for instance by the
provisions of Article XV on legal personality and
diplomat-like privileges and immunities in
accordance with Annex I, aspects which are
conspicuously missing in the Minsk Space
Agreement. Coordination of cooperation in the
framework of ESA 40 is therefore infinitely more
structured and smooth than it will be the case under
the Minsk Space Agreement - at least as soon as old
Soviet habits have withered away under the force of
decen.tralizing tendencies, and new relationships in
prachce concerning space activities have been
established among the states concerned.
This conclusion becomes even more apt if one looks
at the activities that are to take place under the
respective frameworks. ESA, just like the 'Space
CommonWealth', allows of course for space
programs to be executed outside of its framework. 41
Furthermore, where the Minsk Space Agreement to
say the least is somewhat ambiguous when it comes
to military and dual purpose activities, the ESA
Convention is unequivocal in its exclusion of military
activities, whatever the precise meaning of that
phrase. 42 This evaluation is especially important in
the light of the other side of the coin: whereas with
ESA it is effectively excluded that any military organ
or organization is undertaking space activities in its
framework (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU)
taking over these functions), that is not so clear in
respect of the the 'Space Commonwealth'.43
When it comes to the programs to be executed
within its framework, the ESA Convention also
provides for a somewhat clearer and much more
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elaborated distinction than the Minsk Space
Agreement does, almost implicitly, in its Articles 4
and 5. Article V of the ESA Convention is crucial
here, as it makes the basic distinction between
"mandatory activities" and "optional activities", while
adding a specific sub-category of the latter, of
"operational activities". Final comparison on the
Article 4-Article 5-Minsk Space Agreement
respectively Article VO.a)-Article V(1.b)-ESA
Convention congruency must wait until
developments or amendments have clarified these
points; whereas the remaining incongruity perhaps
is solved by the introduction in the ESA Convention
of "operational activities" with respect to "space
applications,,44.
In this respect it must also be noted that Europe has
witnessed the coming into existence of two
commercial companies nurtured by ESA making
use of the developed hardware for launching
respectively
remote
sensing
activities
(Arianespace 45 respectively SPOTlmage46 ) and two
international organizations of a mixed character
using ESA-developed space hardware for
operational activities (EUTELSAT47 and
EUMETSAT48); in all these cases different measures
of participation and involvement, with varying
degrees of privatization, were allowed for and indeed
envisaged.
The structure created for financing space activities
under the ESA Convention is closely related to the
distinction between the various sorts of activities 49 just as it is the case with the Minsk Space
Agreement. Mandatory activities, to be participated
in by all member states, are to be financed in
accordance with an elaborate system of division of
contributions, with the average national income of
the member states as the decisive criterion.50 This
sounds similar to a large extent to the phrase of
Article 4 of the Minsk Space Agreement, on
"proportionate contributions by the states
participating in the present agreement" in regard of
"interstate programs for space research and
explOitation", and would thus be a reason for
comparing the respective sets of activities to be
undertaken thereunder.
Likewise, or rather mirrorwise, for the 'moment the
suggested similarity between "the proportionate
participation" (which may be zero, in theory) as to
expenditure concerning specific activities under
Article 5 of the Minsk Space Agreement, and the
possibility to opt out of the activities covered by
Article V(1.b) of the ESA Convention and the
concurrent proportionate financing 51 of systems
remains noticeable.
The same remark holds more or less true for the
speCial category of "operational activities", where it is
bluntly stated that "[tlhe cost of such operational
activities shall be borne by the users concerned",
and this, "under conditions to be defined by the
Council by a majority of all Member States ..52 .

programs in this respect mlssmg from the Minsk
Space Agreement. In general, these clauses are
formulated in a stricter and more straightforward
sense, but this is perhaps only logical as the
independent existence of an organization such as
ESA provides for a clear and direct 'target' for the
use of 'common' facilities. Otherwise, the issue of
infrastructure and the use thereof is of much less
importance in the case of ESA than it is in the case of
the 'Space Commonwealth'.
The other side to the use of infrastructure finally is
dealt with under Article VIII(1) of the ESA
Convention, where emphasis is laid on the priority of
the use of ESA's infrastructure for its programs and
those of the member states, rather than an absolute
obligation to do so as suggested in the Minsk Space
Agreement 56 ,
Issues of general international space law are not
reflected in the ESA Convention itself. However, the
European Space Agency has made Declarations
whereby it accepted the rights and obligations of the
three principal treaties emanating from some of the
principles of the Outer Space Treaty, notably the
Rescue Agreement57 , the Liability Convention58 ,
and the Registration Convention 59 . Finally, with the
repeated assertion that ESA will be active only for
"exclusively peaceful purposes ..60, compliance with
another cluster of principles (this time material
ones) is guaranteed. 61 In conclusion, ESA through
the years has, been able to take into account to a
considerably greater extent and much more
explicitly as of yet than the 'Space Commonwealth'
the existing rights and obligations of space law.
Like the 'Space Commonwealth', ESA allows for
accession, but unlike it, the ESA Convention allows
for other interesting opportunities in this area than
the rather summary formula of the Minsk Space
Agreement that "[olther states can join the present
agreement,,62. ESA's counterpart to that formula is
found in Article XXII, which allows for accession
"following a decision of the Council taken by a
unanimous vote of all Member States". Apart from
ordinary, full membership the possibility of
"associate membership" is allowed for states whose
only fixed obligation incurred thereby is "to
contribute at least to the studies of future projects
under Article V(1.aj)", i.e. one kind of mandatory
activities, whereas other rights and obligations are to
be "defined by the Council by a two-thirds majority
of all Member States,,63. As already mentioned,
since] 987 Finland has made use of this pOSSibility to
become involved with ESA projects in a
fundamental, yet not comprehensive way.
For another kind of mandatory and for all optional
activities another possibility of cooperation is
enVisaged: that of "participation by non-member
States or international organisations in one or more
of the programmes"64 concerned. Again, detailed
arrangements are to be defined by the Council in
this respect. Canada is the prime example of a non-

Needless to say, these conditions have been shown
to entail proportionality of expenditure to
involvement. Once more, reference may be had
here also to such special examples as Arianespace
and SPOTlmage, where 'expenditure' relates to the
investments by states, directly or indirectly, in these
companies, and EUTELSAT and EUMETSAT, where
in yet another way states are spending in proportion
to the use they are making of specific systems and
services.53
For ESA, the issue of profits potentially resulting
from certain space activities is not directly dealt with
in the Convention. The succinct phrase that
"operational activities", the only ones liable to realize
profits under normal circumstances, are to be
allowed under specific conditions to be provided for
by the Council - as quoted before - nevertheless
leaves ample room for the most logical division of
any profits eventually accruing directly or indirectly
from a specific activity, namely in proportion to the
expenditure on that same activity, as is the case in
the 'Space Commonwealth'. In case of profits arising
under (other) mandatory and optional activities, it
still seems that for example Annex III would also
allow for the logical solution of proportionate
division of eventual profits.
Furthermore, although neither specificly nor exactly
related to the rather general provision concerning
operational activities, it is interesting to note Annex
V, as an extension of Article VII of the ESA
Convention on industrial policy. This Annex provides
for the principle of "just return" as it has been
dubbed, of an "overall return coefficient,,54,
meaning that a minimum percentage (Annex V
provides for an absolute minimum of 80%, while at
present it lies at 96%55) of sums invested by a certain
state in a certain program will have to accrue, in the
form of value of contracts, to companies of those
respective states. If one envisages international
contracts - coupled with the potential to realize
profits of course - granted to one's own private
companies as an indirect kind of profit accruing to
oneself, one could speak of an indirect kind of
proportionate sharing of profits.
At the same time, in the light of this elaborate
system it becomes already clear to what little extent
the Minsk Space Agreement did already reckon with
the possibility of private entities becoming involved
in activities directly under that Agreement. No
doubt, the absence of any significant organizational
structure in the 'Space Commonwealth' will mainly
account for this fact, yet, the difference in this
respect with ESA is telling.
The infrastructure and facilities of ESA may, just as
infrastructure and facilities falling under the Minsk
Space Agreement, also be used for programs not
regulated by the relevant convention, i.e. especially
national programs. This allowance however is with
the caveat that ESA's use for its own activities and
programs should not be prejudiced thereby,
providing for a clear priority of international
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ESA member state having taken the chance for
cooperation in a lot of programs without
fundamental involvement in ESA's day-to-day
business.
Finally, Article XIV leaves ESA and its member
states even more leeway in defining forms of
cooperation by the general formula that "[tlhe
Agency may, upon decisions of the Council taken by
unanimous votes of all Member States, cooperate
with other international organisations and
institutions and with Governments, organisations
and institutions of non-member States, and
conclude agreements with them to this effect,,65.
Thus, for instance ESA in 1988 has entered into the
large international project of realizing and operating
the space station "Freedom" together with the
United States, Japan and Canada, and recently has
realized several agreements with Russia on
. .m speCl'f'IC space proJec
. t s66 .
cooperatlOn
In short: a large range of forms of participation and
cooperation with non-ESA member states. i~ po~sib~e
under the ESA Convention, down to partICIpatIOn m
a specific program only. Of course, complementary
to this large range of forms of participation is a large
range of financial involvement. The history of the
past years has shown how well this flexible
appproach has worked.

the web regulating and stimulating activities while
itself the governmental and responsible body, and
"Les Soch~tes Commerciales Filiales,,70 such as
Arianespace and SPOTImage, actually undertaki~g
activities in outer space - be it with international, In
casu ESA and ESA-member involvement.
Outside Russia, the Kazakhstan Space Agency
(KSA) has been formed 71 , also dubbed Kazakhstan
Kosmos72, already in September 1991. Little can be
said as to its role and functions, however, as the main
Kazakh asset Bajkonur still seems not to be
operated by it. Furthermore, in May 1992 the
National Space Agency of the Ukraine (NSAU) has
been established 73. The NSAU's budget and
direction will be discussed in the Ukrainian
parliament in October 1992; as to the latter issue, a
similar relations~hip between NSAU and NPO
Yuzhnoye (the factory of Zenit ballistic missiles in
Dnepropetrovsk) may be envisaged as between the
RSA and NPO Energia/Glavkosmos, but of course
final analysis will have to wait here, too.
In general it may be concluded that the setting up of
these agencies and the elaboration thereof in the~ry,
although important, is really no more than a fust
step on the road to creation of a true
'Commonwealth In Space' along the lines of the
Minsk Space Agreement. Moreover, the example
developed furthest, that of the RSA74, seems to
point in quite a different direction that such a 'Space
Commonwealth' is to take than ESA has shown so
far: military authorities and activities having been
shown to remain inseparable from civilian ones in
the CIS-framework; opportunities for commercial and certainly private commercial - activities
remaining vague and insecure.
Actual developments in this field likewise seem to
provide us with ambiguous conclusions. Thus, the
Ukraine, by later acceding to the 'Space
Commonwealth', has evidently recognized the
im possibili ty to be active in space without. its
traditional partners in Russia and the launchmg
base in Kazakhstan. On the other hand, historical
and psychological reasons as evidenced for instance
by the Black See Fleet controversy75, as wel1 as
economic and financial reasons may very wel1 force
the Ukraine to look elsewhere in terms of
cooperation?6
. .
The most important issue of controversy wIthm the
'Space Commonwealth' moreover seems to h~ve
been dealt with in a rather haphazard and reactIve
fashion: the preponderance of Russia at the
Bajkonur site in Kazakhstan and the appar~nt
absence so far of any substantial Kazakh authonty
over the base. What meanwhile should be noted, is
that one way or another for the time being it will
remain the military, i.e. the joint strategic armed
forces, alternatively the Unified Armed Forces,
which will be in control of Bajkonur?7
In this respect, in May 1992 an agreement had been
signed in Tashkent by all CIS member states except

5. A "Commonwealth In Space": Developments of
1992
With that we arrive back in 1992, and at the same
time we are back in the Commonwealth of
Independent States, and the 'Space Commonwealth'
of states parties to the Minsk Space Agreement. The
most important developments in terms of space
activities since the conclusion of that Agreement on
30 December 1991 roughly fall into three categories:
internal-institutional, actual-internal and
international-cooperational.
As to the institutional developments taking place on
the territory of the former Soviet Union, the most
fundamental was the establishement of five space
agencies 67 . Three of those were Russian, and on
closer look only one of those would qualify as a 'real'
(national) space agency: the Russian Space Agency
RSA, the Statute of which was approved by a Decree
of 9 April by the Government of the Russian
Federation. 68 It confirms the preponderance of the
military, while leaving rather unclear what role
private organizations can play here. Two other
organizations, NPO Energia and Glavkosmos, are
supposed to take care of the commercial aspects ~f
Russian space endeavours somehow under the aegIs
of the RSA; but it remains to be seen to what extent
they can be called private companies.
Thus, the situation within Russia seems not so much
to resemble the American one69 , where NASA
actively conducts numerous space activities itself, as
it does the French one, with the CNES as a spider in
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Moldova, on the rights over ground infrastructure, in
conformity with the provisions of Articles 5 and 10 of
the Minsk Space Agreement. From what is known so
far, the strategic forces of the CIS indeed basically
remain in control of all ground segment elements,
although the property thereof legally has been
'transferred' to the respective republics on whose
territories they are situated 78.
The most undisputed conclusion which can
therefore be drawn from actual developments within
the CIS in 1992 so far, is that the traditional
interlinkage of various parts of the former Soviet
Union, leading to the present dependence of the
CIS-republics on each other, is a very important, if
not indeed crucial aspect in whatever
'Commonwealth In Space' is going to develop. As of
yet rather little evidence is found in the
developments discussed of a framework arising
according to the spirit and principles of the Minsk
Space Agreement or its individual articles.
On the other hand, space law did not need to be
invoked as of yet by third states in order to remind
CIS-states that their international obligations under
Articles 5, 6 and 7 were not kept. The promise
apparently made to Kazakhstan 79 on refunding any
damage ariSing to that republic as a consequence of
launching activities from Bajkonur is a first
confirmation of these fundamental principles. That,
however, has of course not really much to do with an
ESA-like structure.
Mutatis mutandis, the same applies to relations with
non-'Space Commonwealth' and non-CIS member
states. Experience so far has shown, that whatever
international cooperation efforts were devised, the
partner for third states was not the CIS or the 'Space
Commonwealth', but rather the Russian Federation
and its Russian Space Agency, and, exceptionally,
other individual member states of the CIS. With
ESA that is different; many cooperational efforts
were directed at ESA rather than at its individual
member states.
Russia for all practical purposes indeed seems to
have taken the place of the former Soviet Union, and
not the Commonwealth of Independent States. This
conclusion may perhaps seem a little rash and not
very juridical, but the neglect shown by both US and
ESA space officials· in regard of for instance the
Ukraine's ha~dware, efforts and plans 80, in spite of
the potential of that state in terms of its Zenit
rockets, scientific satellites and instruments, seems
a little too strange to be overlooked ..

6. Conclusion
The main conclusion that can be drawn so far from
the above analysis, is that it seems to be too early for
all practical purposes to compare the 'Space
Commonwealth' with the European Space Agency
on an equal footing. The basic legal framework of the
former as provided by the Minsk Space Agreement,
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through factual ties perhaps still including to some
extent the five non-adherents as well, is far too little
elaborated in this respect. At the same time, the
effort of comparing does indeed highlight some of
the most important aspects of the 'Space
Commonwealth', and it must be said, of the most
important Shortcomings thereof - and thus may
provide a tool for amelioration.
The organizational structure of the 'Space
Commonwealth' is fundamentally different from
that of ESA, and a new Agreement (or related
amendment) would be necessary to create a true
international organization on the basis of the Minsk
Space Agreement instead of a 'mere'
Commonwealth. The potentially disruptive effects of
the absence so far of any institutional structure is
shown by the direction actual developments have
taken since December 1991: the 'Space
Commonwealth' has no· 'body', with all due
consequences thereof. It can only be said that it may
present a beginning, and as such of course is better
than nothing at all.
On the issue of programs, and the related one of
financial arrangements some kind of similarity may
be detected between ESA and the 'Space
Commonwealth'. For the moment however the
differences, especially for instance concerning the
respective roles of military authorities, and, largely
the other way round, the role envisaged for private
enterprise, seem the more telling. Actual
developments seem to relate more to a historically
developed background than to the structure,
however vague, envisaged by the Minsk Space
Agreement. This at the same time means of course
that it is not totally out of the question for future
developments to take yet another direction - for
instance, of closer similarity to ESA.
The relevance of the historical background, of
military preponderance and virtual absence of
private activities, is shown even more clearly when
the issue of infrastructure is considered, where the
respective rules have no relation to each other
whatsoever because of the diametrically opposite
positions of departure, in terms of regulatory
relevance. As a consequence, the rather wellorganized and -coordinated use over the years by
ESA of old and new infrastructure contrasts
significantly with the central problem-generating
role which especially existing infrastructure seems to
have in the context of the 'Space Commonwealth'.
Finally, perhaps the flexibility of both ESAarrangements and the Minsk Space Agreement in
terms of possible variations in intensity and form of
international cooperation, although not identical
when closely scrutinized in a legal way, by being
similar in potentiality, may in the end also provide
the best instrument for safely and peacefully
resolving existing and future conflicts within the
'Space Commonwealth' and the CIS at large, and
steer that 'Space Commonwealth' more in the
direction of a 'Commonwealth In Space'. For
international cooperation, after all a fundamental

principle of the Outer Space Treaty and outer space
law, especially if it on the one hand is to include not
only Russia and on the other hand is yet to include
ESA, can be a particular apt means in the context of
the 'Space Commonwealth' for experiencing the
advantages of developing some kind of European
Space Agency, Mark II.
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